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What are the macroeconomic consequences of the dominant role of the dollar in the international monetary
system?  Here, we present a calibrated two country model in which exports are invoiced in the key
currency, and government bonds denominated in the key currency are held internationally to facilitate
trade.  Domestic government bonds and money are held in each country to facilitate domestic transactions.
Our model generates deviations from uncovered interest parity that are as volatile as some empirical
estimates, but much too small by others.  Our model also speaks to some other empirical anomalies,
such as the Backus - Smith puzzle.  Shocks affecting asset supplies – such as bond financed tax cuts,
and open market operations – have large effects in our model because they generate non-Ricardian
changes in household wealth.  Generally, shocks emanating from the key currency country do more
to destabilize the world economy than equal sized shocks coming from the other country.  Similarly,
monetary and fiscal policy innovations in the key currency country are more potent than those in the
other country.  On the other hand, the key currency country is more vulnerable to financial market




















20th and C Streets, N.W.
Washington, DC 20551
David.J.Lopez-Salido@frb.gov1 This phrase is sometimes attributed to Charles de Gaulle, but is evidently due to Giscard
d’Estaing, in 1965.  See Gourinchas and Rey (2007), footnote 4, for an account.
2 Aliber (1964) cites numerous political discussions of the costs and benefits of being the
key currency country, and he discusses academic arguments to the effect that the U.S. might be
constrained in its ability to lower its payments deficit and in its choice of policies to achieve full
employment.
3 Goldberg and Tille (2008; Table 1) report that large shares of various countries’ imports
and exports are invoiced in dollars.  Lane and Milesi-Ferretti have a series of papers
documenting the proclivity of foreigners for dollar assets; see for example Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007).
1. Introduction
The implications of a key currency were hotly debated in the 1950's and 60's, both in
academia and in political circles.  Valery Giscard d’Estaing, while still a French finance minister,
asserted that the U.S. enjoyed an “exorbitant privilege” because of the role of the dollar in the
international monetary system.
1 The U.S. could finance a current account deficit by issuing dollar
assets at low rates of interest.  Why?  Because a large fraction of international trade was invoiced
in dollars, and dollar assets were desired by importers and exporters to facilitate trade; dollars were
also desired by central banks as official reserves.
2
 The dollar continues to play a dominant role in the international monetary system.
3 And the
dollar figures prominently in current policy discussions: the U.S. has financed most of its recent
current account deficits by issuing dollar denominated debt, and there is much speculation in the
press about what might happen if foreign dollar holders decided to diversify into other currencies.
In this paper, we build a model in which international trade is invoiced in the key currency,
and bonds denominated in the key currency are held to facilitate international trade (and as official
reserves).  Since key currency bonds provide liquidity services, they are held at a low rate of
interest; this is source of the “exorbitant privilege” accruing to the key currency country.  Back of2
4 At the end of 2007, foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury securities amounted to about 90
percent of quarterly U.S. consumption.  We have computed the average liquidity premium on
Treasury securities to be about 0.0065 per quarter.  These imply a value of the exorbitant
privilege of 0.585 percent of consumption.
5 The literature prior to the mid 1970's generally assumed that bonds were imperfect
substitutes; see Branson and Henderson (1985) for a survey.  Then, following the popularity of
the Dornbusch (1976) model, and empirical work in the late 1970's and early 1980's, modelers
gravitated towards the perfect substitutes assumption.
6 Wickens (2008) provides a brief review of this literature.  Lewis (1995) provides a more
extensive review of the earlier literature.
the envelope calculations suggest that this privilege is worth slightly more than a half of a percent
of U.S. consumption each year.
4  And, one of our tasks will be to investigate the potential
consequences of a sudden reversal of the recent buildup of foreign official holdings of dollars.
The recent academic literature has shied away from these issues, and one reason for this is
undoubtedly that currently popular models almost invariably assume that bonds denominated in
different currencies are perfect substitutes: portfolio managers do not distinguish between them if
their expected returns (when evaluated in a common currency) are equal.  Expected returns equalize
in these models, resulting in the standard uncovered interest parity (or UIP) condition.
5 These
models are not suitable for analyzing the asymmetries implied by a key currency: there is no special
role for dollar denominated assets.
    While macroeconomic modeling has generally assumed that bonds are perfect substitutes,
a lively empirical literature has questioned the validity of the UIP condition.  There appear to be
large, frequent and persistent deviations from UIP in the data.
6  And, there have been some efforts
to introduce deviations from UIP into theoretical models, either because the data required it or the
question being analyzed required it.  
Deviations from UIP have been introduced in a variety of ways.  Blanchard et al (2005)3
7 See Pesenti (2008).
8 See Kollmann (2002, 2005), and McCallum and Nelson (2000). 
9 Lewis (1995) surveys early contributions to this literature.  See Alverez, Atkeson and
Kehoe (2007) for a more recent application.
10 Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) provide a rationale for government provision (and
management) of liquidity.  They show that with aggregate uncertainty, the private sector cannot
adequately supply its liquidity needs.  The government can raise welfare by issuing bonds, which
will command a liquidity premium over private debt.
follow a much earlier literature that simply assumes bonds denominated in different currencies are
imperfect substitutes and posits asset demand functions that depend on relative rates of return and
financial wealth.  They expand upon a model by Kouri (1976) to discuss the causes and long run
consequences of recent U.S. current account deficits.  Some versions of the IMF’s GEM assume
portfolio adjustment costs,
7 and this creates portfolio balance effects in the model’s dynamics.  Other
modelers have simply added an exogenous UIP shock, calibrated to match the volatility of exchange
rates and (ex-post) UIP deviations observed in the data.
8  And some take a more structural approach,
modeling the deviations from UIP as endogenous, time varying risk premia.
9  
In this paper, we model deviations from UIP as endogenous, time varying liquidity premia.
More specifically, we build a fully articulated NOEM model in which government bonds
denominated in different currencies provide different kinds of transactions services, making them
imperfect substitutes.  There are two countries in our model – the key currency country and a
country representing the rest of the world.  Both countries price their exports in terms of the key
currency.  Consequently, households in each county use the key currency bond to facilitate their
purchases of imported goods; and within each country, households use their own government bond
and money to facilitate their purchases of domestic goods.
10  Key currency bonds also serve as4
11 This property of our model is consistent with the evidence presented in Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2008) who show that the spread between AAA-rated corporate debt and
government debt is high when the stock of government debt (relative to GDP) is low and is low
when the stock of government debt is high.  They attribute this sensitivity of the spread to
changes in the marginal convenience value of government debt.  Greenwood and Vayanos
(2008) also find that debt stocks affect yield spreads.  They show that the yield curve for
government debt depends on the relative quantities of debt by maturity.  
official reserves.  In this setup, all government liabilities are “liquid” and imperfectly substitutable,
in the sense that each provides a distinct kind of transactions service.
Any liquid asset commands an endogenous, time varying liquidity premium; or equivalently,
in equilibrium, the liquid asset’s pecuniary return is below the return on a safe but illiquid bond
(which we will call the CCAPM rate).  The liquidity premium will vary with the supply of the asset
– an increase in supply reduces the marginal value of transactions services provided by the asset and
reduces the spread between the liquid asset’s rate and the CCAPM rate.
11 Deviations from UIP
reflect the differences in liquidity premia on bonds denominated in the two currencies.  In our
calibrated model, shocks that change the quantity or value of the two liquid bonds and create non
trivial deviations from UIP. 
In this paper, we study the macroeconomic implications of a key currency at business cycle
frequencies.  We do this in three ways.  First, we look at the second moments generated by our
calibrated model.  We show that our model is capable of capturing some features of the U.S. data,
and we also find that our model makes headway in explaining some of the empirical anomalies
documented in the literature, such as the  Backus - Smith puzzle and the high volatility of real and
nominal exchange rates; our model is also capable of generating a “liquidity effect” (or fall in the
nominal interest rate in response to an increase in the rate of money growth).  
Second, we use impulse response functions (IRFs) to study the way in which the key5
currency assumptions – international holdings of the key currency bond, and key currency pricing
of traded goods – work in our model.  Here, we focus on shocks that change the supplies of various
liquid assets: bond financed decreases in taxes, open market operations, and a sell off of foreign
official holdings of the key currency bond. 
The IRFs show that the way we have introduced imperfect substitutability – through time
varying liquidity premia – has far reaching consequences for the importance of financial market
developments on real economic activity.  An earlier empirical literature on portfolio balance models
found only small, and imprecisely measured, effects of changes in bond supplies on relative rates
of return.  Our model is consistent with this empirical result.  Calibrated shocks to asset supplies
produce moderate movements in interest rates and UIP deviations, but they can have large effects
on consumption in our model.  This is because the spread between the liquid bond rate and the
CCAPM rate makes our model non-Ricardian, and shocks can produce large changes in household
wealth.  For example, a bond financed tax cut will generate expectations of future tax liabilities.  In
a Ricardian world, the tax cut would have no effect on consumption: households would simply save
the cut in current taxes to pay future taxes.  In our model however, the tax liability accrues at the
liquid government bond rate, while households discount future tax liabilities at the higher CCAPM
rate; a temporary tax cut generates a positive wealth effect and raises private consumption.  Our
model implies that moderate financial market developments can have important implications for real
economic activity.
And finally, we use our model to investigate the potential consequences of a sudden
unwinding of the “exorbitant privilege” enjoyed by the key currency country.  In particular, we
suppose that foreign central banks suddenly sell off a portion of their key currency reserves; we6
calibrate the sale to match accumulation of official dollar reserves over the last five years.  The
results are dramatic: consumption in the key currency country falls by about one percent after a year
and the decline is persistent. 
Generally speaking, our IRFs indicate that shocks to asset supplies originating in the key
currency county have larger effects at home and abroad than shocks emanating from the other
country.  Partly this is due to portfolio balance effects – changes in supplies and valuations of the
liquid assets.  But, the key currency pricing of exports also plays an important role.  A tax cut, or
an increase in the money growth rate, emanating from the key currency country will reduce the
relative price of imports in both countries.  By contrast, a tax cut or an increase in the money growth
rate in the other country will raise the relative price of imports in both countries.  This implication
of key currency pricing is bound to be a provocative result in our model.
In any case, our results imply that the key currency country can be a greater source of global
instability than other countries.  They also imply that the monetary and fiscal policies of the key
currency country are more potent, domestically and internationally, than the policies of other
countries.  And finally, they imply that the key currency country is susceptible to financial market
shocks – such as a sell off of key currency bonds – in a way that other countries are not.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows:  In Section II, we outline our model and discuss
its calibration.  In Section III, we show that the model makes headway in explaining some important
anomalies or puzzles that have been documented in the empirical literature.  In Section IV, we study
the ways in which our key currency assumptions work in our model, illustrating the asymmetric
effects of changes in various asset supplies.  In Section V, we use our model to study the potential
consequences of a sudden sell off of U.S. debt.  And in Section VI, we conclude with a discussion7
12 Banks use government bonds to manage the liquidity of their deposits, and households
hold them indirectly through their access to money market mutual funds and other financial
institutions.  In Canzoneri, Cumby, Diba and Lopez-Salido (2008a), we present a closed
economy model with banks, bank deposits and bank loans.  Here, due to the complexity of the
two country model, we take a less structural approach.  In Canzoneri, Cumby, Diba and Lopez-
Salido (2008b) we study the dynamic properties of a closed economy version of our present
framework.  In particular, we show that the familiar Taylor Principle is not a necessary condition
for determinacy.  
13 The Euro and the Yen are of course competing for key currency status.  Modeling
competing currencies is beyond the scope of the current paper.
of the implications of our results for future work. 
II. A Two Country Model with a Key Currency
Our model consists of two countries – Home and Foreign; here we have in mind the United
States and the rest of the world.  Bonds are imperfect substitutes for money in each country, and this
makes Home and Foreign bonds imperfect substitutes internationally.
12 The Home country provides
the key currency.
13 Foreign households hold Home bonds to facilitate trade, and the Foreign
government holds Home bonds as reserves.  In the steady state, the current account is balanced, but
international portfolios are not symmetric: Home earnings on Foreign equity are balanced by
Foreign earnings on Home bonds.  Moreover, Foreign firms price their exports in units of the Home
currency.  These two asymmetries – Foreign demand for Home bonds and key currency pricing  of
exports – drive our results.
The rest of the model draws standard features from the NOEM literature.  Monopolistically
competitive firms produce an aggregate consumption good in each country; household consumption
reflects habit formation and a bias for the domestically produced good; labor is the only factor of
production (there being no capital or investment); the labor market is competitive and wages are8
14 A note on notation: H and F subscripts will be used to denote Home and Foreign assets
or products when those bonds or products are used in both countries; Home money, for example,
is not held by Foreign entities, and therefore needs no subscript.  Supercript *’s will denote
Foreign household demands and supplies of assets or products; they will also denote Foreign
interest rates, Foreign inflation rates, velocity, relative prices in the Foreign country, and various
“foreign” variables and parameters. 
flexible, but prices are set ala Calvo.  First, we present the model and its steady state; then, we
discuss its calibration.
II. A. The Model
Home Households –  
In the Home country, there is a continuum of households on the unit interval. The utility of
household h is
(1)  Ut(h) = Et3
4
j=t$
 j-t[log(cj(h)- >cj-1) - 6(1+P)
-1nj(h)
 1+P]
where ct(h) is consumption of a composite final good (defined below), nt(h) is hours of work, ct-1 is
aggregate consumption, and the parameter > is a measure of habit persistence.  Households are
identical in this model; so, we can dispense with household indices.  Moreover, the population has
measure one; so in equilibrium, per capita supplies and demands will be equal to aggregate supplies
and demands.  The household’s budget constraint, in units of the Home consumption good, is
14
(2)  mt + bH,t + (1+Jt)ct = wtnt + (mt-1 + Rt-1bH,t-1)/At + trt - xt + divH,t  +s(qt div
*
F,t)
Home households hold Home money, mt, and Home bonds, bH,t, to finance their purchases (Jtct is
a transactions cost which will be described later); wtnt is real wage income; wt is the competitive
market wage; Rt-1 is the gross nominal interest rate on Home bonds; At = Pt/Pt-1 is the gross rate of
inflation of the Home consumption good price; trt is a lump sum transfer and xt is a lump sum tax;9
15 We do not model the equities market.  We simply assume that each household owns a
proportionate share of the steady state Home country portfolio of Home and Foreign equity.  
The size of this portfolio will be calibrated so that Home earnings on foreign equity balance
Foreign earnings on Home bonds in the steady state.
divH,t is Home dividends, qt is the real exchange rate (Home consumption goods per Foreign good),
div
*
F,t is Foreign dividends, and s is the Home household’s (constant) share of those dividends.
15
Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), we assume that transactions costs are pro-
portional to consumption, and the factor of proportionality is an increasing function of velocity.
(3)  Jt =     (A/vt)(vt - <)
2  for  vt > <
              9   0                      for  vt < <
where < is the satiation level of velocity and A is a cost parameter.  The new element here is in our
definition of velocity
(4)  vt = ct/ # mt
where effective transactions balances –  # mt – are a Cobb Douglass aggregate of money and bonds 
(5)   # mt = mt
HbH,t
(1-H)
where 1-H , [0, 1] measures the importance of bonds in facilitating trade.  
The household’s first order conditions include: 
(6)  wt8t = nt
P  
(7)  (ct - 6ct-1)
-1 = 8t[1 + 2A(vt - <)]   
(8)  1 - A[vt² - <²]H( # mt/mt) = $Et[(8t+1/8t)/At+1] / 1/
˜ Rt
(9)  1 - A[vt² - <²](1-H)( # mt/bt) = Rt$Et[(8t+1/8t)/At+1] = Rt/
˜ Rt
where 8t is the marginal value of wealth, and 
˜ Rt is the CCAPM rate.  We will think of 
˜ Rt as the10
16 The CCAPM bond would be in zero net supply in equilibrium, so we suppressed it in
our equations.
return on a bond that does not provide transactions services;
16 Rt/
˜ Rt  is less than one, reflecting the
non-pecuniary return (or liquidity premium) on Home bonds.  (6) is a standard labor supply curve,
and (7) defines the marginal value of wealth.  When real resources are depleted in the purchase of
consumption goods, the marginal value of wealth is less than the marginal utility of consumption.
(8) and (9) are the first order conditions for money and bonds.
Foreign Households –  
Foreign households are modeled symmetrically, but with one major exception: Foreign
households use the Home bond, in addition to their own money and bonds, to finance their

















































Transactions costs are again proportional to consumption,
                  
(12)  J
*
























However, effective transactions balances –  # m
*
t – are given by 












where 0 < T1, 0 < T2, and T1 + T2 < 1.  





























































Equations (15), (16), (17) and (18) are analogous to the first order conditions for the Home
household.  The Foreign household also holds Home bonds, and (19) is the first order condition for
that decision.  As we shall see, first order conditions (18) and (19) provide the analogue of the
uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition in our model.
Interest rate spreads due to the transactions services of bonds – 
Home and Foreign bonds provide transactions services to households.  So, bonds are
imperfect substitutes for money, and imperfect substitutes for one another.  This is reflected in a
number of interest rate spreads.  First, first order conditions (8) and (9) imply
We can think of the Home CCAPM rate, 
˜ Rt, as a the return on a bond that does not provide
transactions services.  There is a positive spread, 
˜ Rt - Rt, between this rate and the rate on liquid
bonds, since the latter provide a non-pecuniary return.  This spread depends on the ratio of money






























An expansionary open market operation increases the ratio, lowers Rt, and increases the spread.  The
Foreign household’s first order conditions for money and bonds, (17) and (18), imply an analogous






A novel aspect in this paper is that there is a deviation from the usual UIP condition, since
Home and Foreign bonds are imperfect substitutes.  Home and Foreign bonds provide transactions
services to the Foreign household; its first order conditions, (18) and (19), introduce deviations from
UIP in our model.  Linearizing around the steady state (described below) we obtain,
(21) () ( ) () $$ $$
~





















where variables without a time subscript are steady state values and a ^ denotes a percentage
deviation from the steady state value.   The deviation from UIP depends on the ratio of the stocks
of Home and Foreign bonds.  Intuitively, we can think of (21) as:
(22)  dev(UIP) / Rt - {Rt
* + Et[)log(et+1)]} = npr
*
t - nprt. 
where e is the nominal exchange rate and npr and npr* are the marginal non pecuniary returns (or
marginal liquidity value) from holding another unit of the bond in question. The relative marginal
non-pecuniary value of the bond depends on the ratio of Home bond and Foreign bonds in the








F,t.  When, for example, the
ratio falls, npr rises and npr* falls; so, dev(UIP) falls.  This relationship between relative asset
supplies and relative returns figures prominently in the discussion that follows.
The empirical literature on portfolio balance effects in financial markets often considered
regressions of spreads – e.g. ex-post deviations from uncovered interest parity – on relative asset13
quantities.  Equation (21) shows that in our model the coefficient on the relative asset stocks is
proportional to the liquidity premia.  In our model a small liquidity premium (2.6% per annum in
the steady state) implies non-trivial wealth effects with corresponding macroeconomic
consequences.  As we show in Section IV below, the difference in the present values of future tax
liabilities discounted at the rates on liquid and illiquid debt leads to sizable changes in consumption
in response to a temporary tax cut.
Firms, Key Currency Pricing, Intermediate Goods, and Final Goods – 
The modeling of monopolistic competition is now standard; our description can be brief,
focusing on aspects that are specific to our model.  A continuum of monopolistically competitive
firms hire labor on a competitive labor market and produce a continuum of intermediate goods using
a linear technology with a common productivity shock; the log of the productivity shock follows an
AR1 process with autoregressive parameter Dz and innovation ,z,t.  The Home national product, yH,t,
is a CES aggregate of these intermediate goods, with elasticity of substitution ..  The Home
consumption good (appearing in the utility function (1)) is a CES aggregate of Home consumption
of the Home product, cH,t, and Home consumption of the Foreign product, cF,t: 






where :t > ½ reflects a bias for Home goods.  log(:t)follows an AR1 process with mean log(:),









































Intermediate goods firms in each country set their prices ala Calvo; the Calvo parameter is set so that
the average duration of a price “contract” is four quarters in each country.  Here again, however,
there is an important asymmetry due to our assumption of a key currency.   Home firms set prices
in terms of the Home currency, and the law of one price holds for Home goods sold domestically
and abroad (PH,t = etP
*
H,t,  where et is the nominal exchange rate).  Letting lower case letters denote
prices relative to CPIs, 
(27) pH,t = qtp
*
H,t 
By contrast, Foreign firms price their exports in terms Home currency, and the law of one price does
not hold. 
Monetary and Fiscal Policy – 
   The Home government’s flow budget constraint is
(28)  mt + dt = (mt-1 + Rt-1dt-1)/At + pH,tgt + trt - xt
where dt is the supply of Home government bond.  Home government spending falls entirely on the
Home good; log(gt) follows an AR1 process with mean log(g), autoregressive parameter Dg and
innovation ,g,t.  log(xt) follows an AR1 process, with autoregressive parameter Dx and (negative)
innovation ,x,t.  ,x,t is a tax cut shock; it will have interesting effects since bonds provide transactions





























17 The model is non-Ricardian in the sense that the timing of tax payments matter, but 
fiscal policies are Ricardian in the sense of Woodford’s “fiscal theory of the price level”.
solvency:
17
(29)  trt = - Nd(dt-1 -  
& d)
The Foreign government holds Home bonds as reserves, b
G
H,t
*.  The Foreign government’s tax
and transfer schemes are analogous to (25) and (26), but its flow budget constraint is
(30)  mt
* + dt






















* follow AR1 processes, and trt
* responds to the level of the debt.


















For monetary policy, we will consider both interest rate rules and money growth rules.  The
Home policy rules are standard:
(32a)  log(Rt/R 2) = DRlog(Rt-1/R 2) + (1-DR)NBlog(At/A 2) + (1-DR)Ny[log(yH,t) - log(
& yH,t)] + ,R,t 
(32b)  log(Mt/Mt-1) = DMlog(Mt-1/Mt-2) + (1-DM)log(A 2) + ,M,t 
The Foreign policy rules are defined analogously.   
The interest rate rules are of course more realistic, but the impulse response functions
generated with interest rate rules conflate the direct effect of shocks with the effects of the
endogenous response of monetary policy to the shocks.  The fixed money growth rules provide a
simpler conceptual framework for our analysis.  For example, the shock just defined, eB,t, would be
a sterilized foreign exchange intervention with a fixed money growth rule for the Foreign16
government, but not with an interest rate rule.
Equilibrium Conditions and the Current Account
Most of the market equilibrium conditions are obvious.  Here, we focus on those about which
there may be some confusion.  For Home bonds,  






Government spending falls on the domestic good in each country, so












t + (1+Jt)cF,t 
Combining the public and private budget constraints and imposing the market clearing











-1) + s(qt div
*
F,t) 












Home’s current account surplus is Home’s exports (including Foreign’s transactions costs) less
Home’s imports (including transactions costs) less Home’s real interest payments to Foreign plus
Home’s receipts of dividend income from Foreign.  The balance of payments identity links the
current account to the change in Home’s real net foreign assets.
II.B. Calibration of the Model
We do not report the steady state equations but the way we solve for the steady state
equilibrium is dictated by our approach to the model’s calibration.  Some parameters are either
estimated or taken from the literature, such as the productivity process which is taken from Backus,17
18 The banking sector accounts for about 1.6 percent of employment.  We assume that
roughly half of this is associated with facilitating transactions.
Kehoe, and Kydland (1995).  But our model has a number of parameters (in our specifications of
transactions costs and the transactions technology) that we cannot pin down in a standard way.
Moreover, we want our model to match observed ratios of asset stocks to consumption, interest
rates, and inflation.  Our strategy is to set our parameters to match these variables. We set the ratios
reported in the first panel of Table 1 using historical averages and set transactions cost to 0.8 percent
of consumption.
18 We then use the ratios in the steady state equations to back out the parameters
reported in the second panel of Table 1. 
 We do not attempt to calibrate the Foreign country to fit “rest of world” data.  Instead, we
calibrate Home to U.S. data, and then – apart from the key currency features – we calibrate Foreign
in a symmetric fashion. In the steady state, net exports are zero and the current account is balanced,
but international portfolios are not symmetric: Home residents hold equity claims on Foreign firms
and Foreign residents hold Home bonds.  Home residents earn the CCAPM rate on their Foreign
equity claims while Foreign residents earn the liquid bond rate on their Home bond holdings.  And
because liquid assets command liquidity premia in the (non stochastic) steady state, and not just in
the transition dynamics, Home earns a higher rate of return on its foreign assets than it pays on its
foreign liabilities, as is the case in the U.S. data.  Home is a net debtor, but Home equity receipts
from Foreign firms are balanced by Foreign earnings on Home bonds.   The difference in the rates
of return is sufficient in the steady state to balance the income receipts and payments.   
The existence of a liquid premium on bonds that depends on relative asset supplies even in
the steady state implies that permanent changes in monetary and/or fiscal policy that affect the real18
19 Aspects of this are discussed further in Canzoneri, Cumby, Diba and Lopez-Salido
(2008a).
steady state values of liquid assets will affect the steady state liquidity premia.  Monetary and fiscal
policies will therefore affect the steady state equilibrium.
19 For example, (20) also holds in the steady
state.  The steady-state CCAPM rate is given by A/$ and does not depend on the ratio m/b.  An open
market operation that increases m/b will therefore reduce the steady state interest rate.
III. Fitting the Data and Addressing Puzzles in the Literature
Much can be learned by generating second moments from our calibrated model and com-
paring these moments with the corresponding statistics in the quarterly data.  In performing this
exercise, we use our estimated interest rate rules for monetary policy; in the next section, we employ
money growth rules to better understand the workings of our model.  Our purpose here is to see how
well our rather rudimentary model fits some of the standard features in the U.S. data, to see whether
our model can address some well known empirical puzzles, and to see which shocks or structural
features of the model contribute most in these assessments.
Unconditional moments are reported in Table 2.  The second column reports statistics (or
targets for the model to fit) from the data; these statistics are described in the Appendix.  In the last
five columns of Table 2, we report moments generated from five versions of the model, adding
shocks or structural features one by one.
Moments in the third column of Table 2 come from a stripped down version of the model
which may be described as an International Real Business Cycle model: prices are flexible; bonds19
20 The departures from symmetry are: (1) Foreign households and the Foreign
government hold Home bonds and Home households hold claims on Foreign dividends in return;
and (2) both Home and Foreign exporters set prices in Home currency.
do not provide transactions services (the model is Ricardian); and the Home demand shock is shut
down.  Moments in the fourth column come from a version of the model which may be described
as a standard New Open Economy Model; it starts with the IRBC model and adds producer currency
Calvo price setting (exports are priced in the sellers currency).  Moments in the fifth column come
from a version of the model that adds the demand shock.  Moments in the sixth column add key
currency pricing of exports. And finally, moments in the last column come from the full blown Key
Currency model, obtained by  adding liquid bonds and a special role for the key currency bond.
III. 1. Capturing Some Standard Features in the U.S. Data
   Our model does fairly well in capturing standard features of the U.S. data.  This is perhaps
somewhat surprising since we have not modeled investment and we have not calibrated the Foreign
country to match any particular country or group of countries.  Instead, our model is symmetric apart
from the features associated with Home’s key currency status.
20 
Looking at the first row of moments in Table 2, we see that Home inflation in the IRBC
model is, as might be expected, more volatile than U.S. inflation.  The standard NOEM models
(columns 4 and 5) bring volatility down, but not enough.  Adding key currency pricing (columns 6
and 7) brings the model in line with the data.  In the second row of moments, we see that Home
consumption is not as volatile in any version the model as it is in the U.S. data; in fact, the IRBC
model does better on this score than the standard NOEM models (columns 4 and 5).  Adding liquid
bonds (column 7) raises the volatility to the level of the IRBC.  Why?  Variance decompositions (not20
reported here) show that adding this non-Ricardian element allows demand shocks to play a much
bigger role, presumably through their effect on household wealth.  Much the same story holds for
the volatility of the Home interest rate, and the interest rate differential.  Volatility is too low in all
versions of the model, and the IRBC model does better than the standard NOEM models.  The Key
Currency model raises the volatility to match the IRBC model.  
III. 2. Addressing Puzzles in the Literature
The Key Currency model makes some headway in addressing several anomalies that have
been documented in the empirical literature.  While the model does not resolve all of these puzzles,
it does do significantly better than the IRBC model or the standard NOEM models.  
The fifth and sixth rows of moments in Table 2 address the exchange rate volatility puzzle:
IRBC models and NOEM models have a hard time matching the volatility of the nominal and  real
exchange rates that has been documented in the data.  Columns 5, 6 and 7 show that adding the
demand shock, then key currency pricing, and finally liquid bonds, increases these volatilities
dramatically.  The next row of Table 2 shows that all of the sticky price versions of the model do
a good job of matching the correlation between real and nominal exchange rates found in the data;
this is not lost in the Key Currency model.
Row 8 in Table 2 speaks to the Backus and Smith puzzle.  Backus and Smith (1993) argue
that the correlation between changes in the real exchange rate and changes in relative consumption
is between -0.6 and 0.2 in the data, but much higher in IRBC models.  In our model, the correlation
falls within the Backus - Smith range, due in large part to our demand shock.  As can be seen from
the eighth row of moments, the correlation is 0.67 for the IRBC and standard NOEM model without
the demand shock.  When the shock is added, the correlation in the standard NOEM model comes21
down to 0.16, which is near the top of the Backus - Smith range.  And the correlation in our Key
Currency Model fall to -0.43, near the bottom of the Backus - Smith range.  These correlations are
very sensitive to the asymptotic variance of the demand shock.  Our point estimate of the auto-
regressive parameter in the shock process is 0.95 (see the Appendix), which implies a very large
variance.  If we lower this parameter to 0.90, then the correlation in the standard NOEM model rises
to 0.52, and the correlation on our Key Currency model rises to -0.18, which is at the center of the
Backus - Smith range. 
The final line in the top part of Table 2 speaks to a related puzzle.  IRBC models generate
a correlation between Home and Foreign consumption that is too close to 1.0.  As can be seen in
Table 2, adding sticky prices, a demand shock, and vehicle currency pricing do relatively little to
reduce that correlation.  The non-Ricardian features of our model are instrumental in reducing the
correlation to the middle of the range reported by Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland.
The next to last row in Table 2 addresses the uncovered interest parity puzzle.  In models that
assume home and foreign bonds are perfect substitutes, UIP holds exactly, but we seem to observe
large and persistent deviations from UIP in the data.  Some models posit a (largely) unexplained
shock to UIP to fill the gap.  In our model there is no need for an artificial shock; equilibrium
deviations from UIP occur in response to all of the shocks in the model.  
Our model generates UIP deviations with a standard deviation of 44 basis points (expressed
at an annual rate), or about a third of the standard deviation for interest differentials (as reported in
row 4, at a quarterly rate).  This value is large enough to be of consequence, but it may or may not
be deemed sufficient to be consistent with the data.  The empirical literature is split on this issue.
One approach uses the volatility of fitted values of regressions of either the change in the exchange22
rate or of the ex-post deviation from UIP on the interest rate differential.  This approach yields
extremely large estimates of the volatility.  Lewis (1995) characterizes the volatility as between 9
and 11 percent at an annual rate.  This corresponds to 3.3 - 4.3 times the volatility of the interest
differential in our model.  By this measure, our model’s standard deviation is too small by a factor
of 20 or more.  A second approach used in the literature, which is taken by Froot and Frankel (1989),
uses survey data to measure expected exchange rate changes.  This approach yields considerably
smaller estimates of the volatility of UIP deviations – mostly in the 30 - 35 basis point range,
although one estimate is nearly 80 basis points.  In summary, depending on which set of estimates
we believe, the volatility of deviations from UIP generated by our model is either about right, or too
small by an order of magnitude.
Finally, although our model generates nontrivial deviations from UIP, it does not resolve the
forward premium puzzle.  As can be seen from the last line in Table 2, the correlation between the
lagged interest differential and exchange rate changes is positive for each of the models we consider.
Resolving the forward premium puzzle would require that the model generate a negative correlation.
IV. Macroeconomic Implications of a Key Currency in Our Two Country Model
Our key currency assumptions – Home bonds held by Foreign households, and all exports
invoiced in Home currency – imply asymmetries that are not found in standard NOEM models.  To
understand these asymmetries, and to assess their importance, we now ask how various shocks pass
through our two country model.  Our two countries are symmetric except for the key currency
assumptions; so, differences in analogous impulse response functions (IRFs) are attributable to the
existence of a key currency. 23
Our modeling of the key currency entails portfolio balance considerations and pricing
considerations.  To isolate the portfolio balance effects and to highlight the non-Ricardian features
of our model, which arise from the liquidity of bonds, we begin our discussion with a flexible price
version of the model.  We also assume that monetary policy is characterized by fixed money growth
rules (instead of interest rate rules); this allows a cleaner interpretation of the shocks that change the
supplies of Home and Foreign currency assets.  We consider a number of these shocks: Home and
Foreign tax cuts increase the supplies of the Home and Foreign government bonds; and Home and
Foreign money growth shocks substitute money for bonds.  After we understand these fundamental
portfolio balance considerations, we add Calvo price setting and the key currency pricing of exports.
As we shall see, sticky and asymmetric pricing has a dramatic effect on the way shocks pass through
our model economy, modifying the basic portfolio balance considerations we began with.
It may be helpful to state our three basic results at the outset.  First, shocks affecting asset
supplies have big effects on consumption, and real economic activity generally, because changes
in liquid bonds create large non-Ricardian wealth effects.  Second, shocks emanating from the key
currency country have a greater effect on consumption, both domestically and abroad, than shocks
emanating from the other country.  There are two basic reasons for this second result: key currency
bonds are held internationally, and key currency pricing implies positive relative price effects
(analogous to terms of trade effects) in both countries for shocks to assets denominated in the key
currency, and negative relative price effects in both countries for shocks to assets that are not
denominated in the key currency.  And finally, shocks to asset supplies imply large valuation effects
and sudden  jumps in the current account, jumps that dwarf subsequent movements in the trade
balance.  We should note that these valuation effects are not captured in the conventional balance24
21 See Kollmann (2006).
of payments measure of the current account;
21 our analysis suggests that they are big and very
important to our understanding of the international transmission of shocks. 
IV. A.  A Bond Financed Home Tax Cut 
We begin by considering an unexpected, but persistent (Dx = 0.9), reduction in Home lump
sum taxes; the size of the initial shock is one percent of output.  This tax cut increases the wealth
of Home taxpayers.  Why?  The government issues bonds to cover the decrease in revenue, and
taxpayers know that future tax liabilities have increased.  But, households discount future income
and tax liabilities at the CCAPM rate, while the government borrows at a lower rate of interest
because its bonds provide a non-pecuniary return; so, the temporary tax cut generates a positive
wealth effect.  (Equivalently, the household could invest its tax cut in CCAPM bonds and have more
than enough to pay its future tax liabilities.)  In addition, the Home government collects seigniorage
on the low interest bonds that it has the power to issue, lowering the tax burden and increasing the
wealth effect.  Finally, the additional bonds issued by the Home government augment the supply of
liquid assets available to Home and Foreign households, generating an expansionary, and
inflationary, liquidity effect.
With Flexible Prices (top panel of Figure 1)
The increase in wealth makes Home households want to consume more and work less,
decreasing output and raising real wages.  The rise in consumption, combined with home bias,
requires a real appreciation of the Home currency.  This increase in the relative price of Home goods
is a decline in the Foreign country’s terms of trade.  That decline creates a negative wealth effect,25
which reduces Foreign consumption and raises the Foreign labor supply.  Output rises in the Foreign
country, and real wages fall.  The negative wealth effect arising from the adverse terms of trade
movement is reinforced by an increase in seigniorage that Foreign households pay to the Home
government, since in equilibrium they end up holding more of the low interest Home government
bonds.  For Home households, the increased seigniorage revenue from abroad decreases tax
liabilities and reinforces the positive wealth effect arising from the tax cut.
The increase in the supply of Home bonds requires an adjustment of portfolios, which is
accomplished by a change in relative asset prices, or equivalently, asset returns.  Foreign households
are the only agents in our model that hold both Home and Foreign bonds, and their portfolio
demands play the major role here.  The increase in the relative supply of Home bonds causes its
relative price – the Home nominal exchange rate – to depreciate.  In equilibrium, the ratio of Home




F,t – falls.  To make Foreign house-
holds want to hold this new portfolio, the relative expected rate of return on Home assets must fall;
that is, the initial deviation from UIP must be negative.  But as the Home government continues to
issue more Home bonds over time, the bond ratio rises, and the deviation from UIP must rise to
maintain equilibrium in bond markets.
From Figure 1, the initial fall in the deviation from UIP is about -12 basis points (at an
annual rate), while the subsequent rise over the next twenty quarters is about 20 basis points.  These
rather modest figures seem consistent with an earlier empirical literature that failed to find large and
significant effects of changes in asset supplies on relative rates of return.
How is this accomplished in the financial markets?  Each of the returns in (22) – Rt, Rt
*, and
- Et[)log(et+1)] – plays a role.  From (20), Rt rises in response to the decrease in the ratio mt/bH,t; and26
from (9) and (18), Rt
* rises because the fall in B
*




F,t.  In equilibrium, mt/bH,t




F,t; so, Rt rises more than Rt
*.  A large increase in Et[)log(et+1)] (not pictured) is
therefore needed for bond market equilibrium.
Home bonds are used by households in both countries to facilitate trade; so, the Home
government’s issue of new bonds increases world liquidity (and decreases transactions costs in the
household budget constraints).  This increases consumption demand and raises the price levels in
both countries.  Not surprisingly, Home inflation exceeds Foreign inflation.
Figure 1 also shows the reaction of the Home current account, which is defined in (36) as
the change in real net foreign assets; in our graphs, the current account is measured as a fraction of
Home steady state output.  The current account deficit that follows the first period makes sense:
Home consumption rises and Home production falls, and a trade deficit ensues.  What is interesting
is the initial positive spike, which results from valuation effects.  The jump in prices lowers the real
value of Home debt to foreigners; so, the real interest payments to foreigners fall in the initial period.
 Adding Calvo Price Setting and Key Currency Pricing of Exports (bottom panel of Figure 1)
As before, a Home tax cut increases the supply of Home bonds, raising Home wealth and
increasing the supply of world liquidity.  But with sticky prices, the inflationary effect is spread out
over 10 quarters; so, the real value of liquid assets is not inflated away as quickly.  And since prices
do not rise as much, consumption demand is higher, and firms have to meet this demand.  Home
consumption rises much more than in the flexible price case, and output rises instead of falling.
The key currency pricing of exports has more provocative implications: a Home tax cut
initially reduces the relative price of the imported good for both Home and Foreign households.27
This is due to an asymmetry in exchange rate passthrough, which is due in turn to the key currency
pricing of exports.  As in the case of flexible prices, the expansion of Home consumption (in
conjunction with home bias) requires a decline in the relative price of Foreign goods, pF,t/pH,t, for
Home consumers; the nominal exchange rate plays no direct role in this because Foreign exporters
set prices in terms of the Home currency.  But Home exporters also set prices in Home currency, and
the depreciation of the Home nominal exchange rate reduces the Foreign currency price of Home




H,t, rises for Foreign consumers.  pF,t/pH,t falls at the








H,t is however reversed after a couple of quarters, as
firms get to reset their prices.  
In any case, these relative price movements are analogous to an improvement in the terms
of trade for households in both countries, increasing consumption in each.  And in contrast with the
flexible price case, Foreign consumption actually rises for a few quarters.  Developments in financial
markets and in the current account are qualitatively similar to those in the flexible price case.
IV. B.  A Bond Financed Foreign Tax Cut 
Here we consider a Foreign tax cut of equal size; that is, Foreign lump sum taxes are cut by
one percent of output, and the tax cut is as persistent as the Home tax cut.  Aside from the initial
valuation effect on the current account, the effects of a Foreign tax cut are qualitatively similar to
those of a Home tax cut.  But significant differences in the magnitude of the responses do arise.
Foreign bonds are not held by Home households; so, one might expect that the spillover effects of
the Foreign tax cut will be smaller than those of a Home tax cut.  What is, perhaps, surprising is that
the own effects of the Foreign tax cut also differ significantly from those of a Home tax cut.
With Flexible Prices (top panel of Figure 2)28
A Foreign tax cut raises Foreign wealth for the same reason as before – the actual tax liability
grows at a rate that is lower than the rate at which Foreign households discount their tax liabilities.
This wealth effect raises Foreign consumption and reduces Foreign labor supply.  Foreign output
falls and Foreign real wages rise.  And, as with the Home tax cut, a reduction in Foreign taxes
generates a wealth transfer.  Increased Foreign consumption, combined with home bias, produces





This “terms of trade” effect reinforces the wealth increase for Foreign households and reduces Home
wealth.  
Seigniorage payments also change as a result of the Foreign tax cut.  The expansion in
Foreign consumption raises foreign liquidity demand and Foreign households acquire more Home
bonds.  This will result in a wealth transfer from Foreign to Home equal to the present value of the
change in seigniorage revenues, which mitigates the increase in Foreign consumption and the
reduction in Foreign labor supply.  Because of Home’s key currency status, both Home and Foreign
tax cuts raise foreign seigniorage payments to Home.  This asymmetry implies that a Foreign tax cut
has a smaller own effect on consumption, output, hours worked, real wages, and relative prices than
does a Home tax cut.
These asymmetries are quite pronounced, as can be seen by comparing Figures 1 and 2.
Consider, for example, the implications of Home and Foreign tax cuts for consumption.  The own
effect on consumption of a Foreign tax cut is almost an order of magnitude smaller than the own
effect of a Home tax cut.  Similarly, the spillover effect of a Foreign tax cut is almost an order of
magnitude smaller. 
The adjustment of international portfolios is analogous to the previous case with one major29
22 In other parameterizations, the ratio and dev(UIP) can rise on impact; and then fall as
the deficit continues.
exception: adjustment once again requires a small negative deviation from UIP.  Symmetry with the
previous case might have suggested a positive deviation.  However, in equilibrium, the ratio of




F,t – in the Foreign households portfolio falls slightly:
22 the
fall in et does not quite offset the rise in B
*
F,t.  As the deficit continues, the ratio and the deviation
from UIP continue to fall.  After 20 quarters the deviation from UIP is about -30bp.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the initial valuation effect on the Home current account
is much the same for Home and Foreign tax cuts.  Here, as in the case of the Home tax cut, the rise
in the Home price level inflates away the real value of the Foreign debt to Home taxpayers, and
initially, the real interest payments fall.  This produces a spike in the Home current account that is
much larger in absolute value than the trade surpluses that follow.
Adding Calvo Price Setting and Key Currency Pricing of Exports (bottom panel of Figure 2) 
The asymmetries due to key currency pricing found in Figure 2 are striking.  The relative
price of Foreign goods (pF,t/pH,t) rises for Home consumers, as was the case with flexible prices.




H,t) falls for Foreign consumers.  These asym-
metries are again due the an asymmetry in exchange rate passthrough.  The increase in Foreign
consumption (in conjunction with home bias) drives up pF,t/pH,t, and nominal exchange rate
movements play no direct role in this because Foreign exporters price in terms of Home currency.
However, Home exporters also price in terms of the Home currency, and the appreciation of the









H,t eventually rights itself, but it30
takes longer to do so than in the case of a Home tax cut. 
The interesting thing to note here is that the Foreign tax cut raises the relative prices of
imports for households in both countries, while the Home tax cut reduces the relative price of
imports for both.  Key currency pricing of exports implies an asymmetry in exchange rate
passthrough, and in turn, this asymmetry in passthrough implies that the Home tax cut induces a
positive wealth effect in both countries, while the Foreign tax cut produces a negative wealth effect
in both.  So, we now see that both of our key currency assumptions – that Foreign households hold
Home bonds, and that Home exporters price in terms of Home currency – work in same direction
to make the Foreign tax cut’s own effects and spillover effects on consumption weaker than those
of the Home country’s tax cut.  Indeed, this can be seen directly by comparing Figures 1 and 2. 
IV. C. Money Growth Shocks  
 Finally, in Figure 3 we compare the effects of Home and Foreign money growth shocks of
equal size.  The Home shock is more expansionary, in terms of its own effects and its spillover
effects.  In fact, the Home shock actually raises Foreign consumption and output.  These differences
can be explained along the lines of the previous arguments, with asymmetric exchange rate
passthrough playing a prominent role.  In particular, with the Home shock, both countries experience
a decline in the relative price of imports, and with the Foreign shock, both experience an increase.
It is also interesting to note that our Key Currency model generates a liquidity effect: an increase
in money growth decreases both nominal and real interest rates, and expands output.  This “liquidity
effect” has been difficult to generate in NNS models; and indeed, the nominal interest rate rises in
the NOEM (with producer currency pricing) version of our two country model.31
23 If the foreign central bank followed the money growth rule used in the last section, the
asset sale we are considering would be equivalent to a sterilized foreign exchange intervention. 
24 The Home government receives two kinds of seigniorage in our model.  It receive
seigniorage on the cash it issues: (
˜ Rt  - 1)Mt (where M is nominal); and it receives seigniorage on
the bonds it issues: (
˜ Rt - Rt)Bt (where B is nominal).
V.  A Sudden Unwinding of the Exorbitant Privilege
By of the end of 2007, foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasury securities had increased by
nearly 150 percent since the end of 2000 and by more than 90 percent (or $758 billion) since the end
of 2002.  In other words, the U.S. has financed its recent current account deficits in large part by
issuing low interest debt.  Some observers think this trend is not sustainable, and they worry about
the consequences of a sudden unwinding of the “Exorbitant Privilege”.
Here, we use our Key Currency model to analyze the macroeconomic consequences of a
partial unwinding of the recent official reserve accumulation.  The size, and permanence, of a
potential sell off of U.S. securities is of course a matter of speculation.  We choose to consider an
unexpected, but persistent, sale of Home bonds by the Foreign central bank equal to the reserve
buildup since the end of 2002, and we assume the half life of the shock is about five years.  The
macroeconomic consequences of this sale depend on what the Foreign government does with the
proceeds, and on how the monetary authorities in both countries react.  Here, we assume that the
Foreign government uses the proceeds of the sale to buy back its own debt.  And, we assume that
the monetary authorities follow the interest rate rule (32).
23 
The Foreign government’s sale of Home bonds results in a wealth transfer from Home
taxpayers to Foreign taxpayers.  When the Foreign government holds Home bonds as reserves, it is
paying a seigniorage tax to the Home government.
24  Put another way, Foreign taxpayers are giving32
25 The IRFs are linear in the size of the shock.  So, the reader who wants to consider a
smaller (or larger) shock can do so by simply re-scaling: a sale of half the size, will have half the
effect on consumption.  In the same vein, we should also note that the IRFs are computed from a
linearization of the model, and they may not be very accurate for large shocks, such as the one
we are considering here.
26 These reactions are not quite symmetric because transactions costs differ in the two
countries.
27 This interest rate effect between two estimates in the literature.  Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2008) estimate that if foreign central banks were to sell all of their dollar
assets, U.S. Treasury rates would rise by less than 50 basis points.  Warnock and Warnock
(2006) estimate that eliminating one year (2004) of foreign official purchases would raise (long-
term) U.S. interest rates by 90 basis points.
Home taxpayers a low interest loan (lower than the Foreign taxpayers could get on a CCAPM bond).
When the Foreign government sells Home bonds, it reverses the process, and the resulting wealth
transfer unwinds Home’s “Exorbitant Privilege.”
This wealth transfer has the predictable effects of lowering Home consumption and raising
Foreign consumption, and as can be seen in Figure 4, these effects are sizable:
25 Home consumption
is lower by just under one percent after a year, and the decline is nearly as large after two years; the
increase in Foreign consumption is about the same magnitude.
26  
The sale of Home bonds by the Foreign central bank creates an excess supply of Home
bonds, which results in an immediate depreciation of the Home currency of approximately 5%.  The




F,t – in the Foreign household’s portfolio rises in
equilibrium.  Portfolio adjustment requires an increase in the relative return on Home bonds, or a
positive deviation from UIP, of 3.5 percent (at an annual rate).  Home interest rates rise by about 50
basis points (at an annual rate) initially and one percentage point after a few quarters.
27 Foreign
interest rates fall by about 2 percentage points initially, but that decline diminishes steadily.  The33
rest of the deviation from UIP comes from an expected appreciation of the Home nominal exchange
rate.  
 Finally, the Home current account improves by about 0.8 percent of GDP.  The expected
increase in net exports is initially reinforced by an inflation induced decline in the real value of the
debt to foreigners.  After a couple of quarters, the increase in interest payments offsets the effect of
inflation on the real value of Home debt held abroad, and real interest payments to Foreign bond
holders rise.
In summary, a sudden and persistent sell off of Home bonds, calibrated to undo the accum-
ulation of dollar denominated reserves over the last five years, results in a large depreciation of the
Home exchange rate, moderate (though significant) movements in interest rates, and substantial
effects on Home and Foreign consumption.  
VI. Conclusion
Does the United States actually benefit from its key currency status.  It enjoys an “exorbitant
privilege”, which we have estimated to be slightly more than one half of a percent of consumption
per year.  But there would also appear to be costs.  We have presented a calibrated two country
model in which the countries are symmetric except for the fact that the Home country has key
currency status: both countries price their exports in Home currency, and both countries hold Home
government bonds to facilitate international transactions.  Our results imply that there are important
asymmetries due to the existence of a key currency.  But do these asymmetries work to the
advantage of the U.S.?  Our results imply that U.S. monetary and fiscal policy innovations are more34
potent because of its key currency status.  
Our results also suggest that the shocks emanating from the U.S. contribute more to
destabilize the world economy than shocks from the rest of the world.  In Section IV, we focused
on money growth rules, and we did not mention productivity shocks.  Figure 5 shows the effects of
the tax cut under the interest rate rule for monetary policy, and Figure 6 shows the effects of a
productivity shock, also under the interest rate rule.  Shocks coming from the key currency country
generally have bigger own effects and spillover effects than equal sized shocks from the other
country.  
And finally, our results suggest that the United States is much more vulnerable to financial
market turbulence – such as a sudden sell off in dollar denominated debt – than other countries.  It
is not clear that all of this works to the U.S.’s advantage.  That question would appear to be a fruitful
topic for future work.  Of independent interest, our Key Currency model generates deviations from
uncovered interest parity that are as volatile as some (but certainly not all) empirical estimates.  
Larger DSGE models developed for policy analysis [e.g., Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2005)
and Faruqee, Laxton, Muir, and Pesenti (2005)] incorporate a number of real rigidities, adjustment
costs, and departures from optimizing behavior that are potentially relevant for the questions we
address in this paper.  We have not incorporated these features in our model to focus our discussion
on the new features we introduce in this paper; but adding these features could make the effects we
discuss larger.  For example, adding myopic consumers would imply larger departures from
Ricardian Equivalence than what we report, and portfolio adjustment costs would lead to bigger
deviations from UIP.   
Our model also speaks to some other empirical anomalies, such as the Backus - Smith puzzle35
and exchange rate volatility puzzle, and our model generates a “liquidity effect” in response to an
increase in money growth.  Liquidity effects have been hard to produce in NNS models
Shocks affecting asset supplies – such as bond financed tax cuts, foreign exchange
interventions, and increases in money growth – have large effects in our model because they
generate non-Ricardian changes in household wealth.  The non-Ricardian nature of our model stems
from the way we have chosen to make money and bonds imperfect substitutes: we assume both
money and bonds provide liquidity services, rather than focusing on, say, risk premia.  And this is
probably what distinguishes our work most from the rest of the literature.       36
Appendix: Estimated Model Parameters
1.  Fiscal Variables
a. Government purchases
Regress: log(gt) on a time trend and save residuals as detrended series ldt(gt)
  ldt(gt) = ( + Dg ldt(gt-1) + ,g,t
Data: log(gt) = log of real government consumption and investment, NIPA Table 1.1.5, deflated
to real terms using the price index for GDP
Sample: 1974:1 - 2007:4
Estimates: Dg = 0.98
F(,g) = 0.0086
b. Taxes
Regress: log(xt) on a time trend and save residuals as detrended series ldt(xt)
   ldt(xt) = ( + DJ ldt(xt-1) + ,x,t
Data: log(xt) = log of real current government receipts, NIPA Table 3.1, line 1, deflated by price
index for GDP
Sample: 1974:1 - 2007:4
Estimates: Dx = 0.90
      F(,x) = 0.02
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* = foreign official holdings U.S. Treasury Securities, Flow of Funds, Table L.107, 
line 9 converted into real terms by dividing by the price index for personal consumption
expenditures.
Sample period: 1974:1 - 2007:4
Estimates: DB = 0.964
      F(,B) = 0.0434
3.  Elasticity of substitution in home consumption: Taken from Heathcoate and Perri (2002).  
The elasticity can also be estimated from the regression:
log(cF,t) = "0 + "1 log(ct) + "2 log(pF,t) + ,u37
Data:  We use two series for cF,t, real imports of consumer goods and services.  Both are taken from
NIPA table 4.2.5.  One is the sum of  lines 26, 35, 36, 42, 43 converted into real terms by
deflating by price index for non-oil imports.  The other is line 38, imports of nondurable
consumer goods, deflated by the corresponding price index.
log(ct) = log of real personal consumption expenditures
pF,t = price index for non-oil imports/price index for PCE or the price index for imports of
nondurable consumer goods/price index for PCE.
Sample period: 1974:1 - 2007:4
Estimates: "1: The two estimates are 0.97 and 1.30 and neither differs significantly from 1.0, the
value implied by equation 25. 
"2: The two estimates are -1.03 and -0.83, which bracket the Heathcoate-Perri value,
-0.9.
Du: Both estimates are 0.95.
F(,u) = 0.031 at an annual rate or 0.00775 per quarter
4. Monetary Policy Rule
a. Interest Rate Rule, equation (32), 
log(Rt/R 2) = DRlog(Rt-1/R 2) + (1-DR)NBlog(At/A 2) + (1-DR)Ny[log(yH,t/
& yH,t)] + ,R,t . 
Parameter values (DR = 0.8, NB = 2.0, Ny = 0.20, and F(,R) = 0.009) are taken from Canzoneri,
Cumby, and Diba (2007b) who estimate a rule for the Volker-Greenspan period.  We set the steady-
state inflation and federal funds rates at their quarterly averages for the same period used to estimate
the interest rate rule.  These values are 0.7 and 1.1 percent per quarter.
b. Money Supply Rule 
log(Mt/Mt-1) = (1-DM)log(A 2) + DMlog(Mt-1/Mt-2) + ,M,t.
Parameter values (DM = 0.5 and  F(,M) = 0.009) are taken from Ohanian, Stockman, and Kilian
(1995).
5. Interest Rate Differentials and Effective Exchange Rates
a. Effective Exchange Rates
Data: Nominal and real effective exchange rates from IFS (ULC definition because of length of
sample for real effective exchange rate exceeds that based on CPIs).
Use first difference of logs 
Sample: 1974:1 - 2007:4
Estimates: F() log e) = 0.028
F() log q) = 0.02938
corr() log e, ) log q) = 0.943
b.  Interest rate differentials
Data: Money market interest rates for United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and
Japan (IFS). 
Sample: 1974:1 - 2007:4
Estimates: F(R) = 0.004
F(R - R*) = .004 (average of the four)
c.  CCAPM rate and Spread
The CCAPM rate (equivalently, $) is, of course, unobservable.  In Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba
(2007a) we compute CCAPM rates for several specifications of preferences.  The average of the five
real CCAPM rates reported in Table 1 of that paper is 5.07 percent per annum.  The real interest rate
rate faced by the highest quality (prime or AAA) borrowers over the same sample that we use to
estimate our monetary policy rule averages just under five percent.  Over that same sample, the real
rate on three-month Treasury bills averaged about 2.4 percent per annum, which implies a spread
between the CCAPM rate and the rate of three-month Treasury bills of 2.6 percent per annum.  We
therefore set our real CCAPM rate to 1.25 percent per quarter ($ = 1/1.0125) and our spread at 0.65
percent per quarter.
Data: Three-month constant maturity Treasury bill rate from 1982 on.  Prior to 1983, the secondary
market rate on three-month bill, converted from a discount basis to an investment basis.
Inflation data are computed as quarterly percent changes in the CPI-U.
6.  Asset ratios
a. Treasury Securities
Data: BH = Private US holdings of Treasury Securities = Total outstanding less sum of central bank
holdings, ROW holdings, and Government holdings.  




* = Official ROW holdings of Treasury Securities.  
Source Flow of Funds, Table L.107.
B
*
F,t = Private ROW holdings of Treasury Securities.  
Source Flow of Funds, Table L.107.
Mt = Currency held outside of banks.
Source Flow of Funds, Table L.108
C = Personal Consumption Expenditures.  Source NIPA Table 1.1.5.
Sample: 1974:1 - 2007:4
BH/C = bH/c = 1.00




*/C = 0.63 (2007:4)
B
*
F,t /C = 0.30 (2007:4)
We use a different sample for these two ratios to take into account the recent buildup in
dollar balances both by foreign central banks and by the foreign private sector.40
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Table 1: Calibration
Ratios, averages in the data









0.25 0.25 1.00 0.30 0.70 0.59 0.008
Derived Parameters
<  <*A A *HT 1 T2
0.31 0.44 0.007 0.005 0.42 0.42 0.41
Estimated Parameters (standard deviations of shock innovations are reported in the Appendix)
A 2,A 2* DB Dg Dx DM DR NB Ny
1.007 0.96 0.98 0.90 0.5 0.8 2.0 0.2
Other Parameters 
$, $* >, >* :, :* J, J* P, P*
˜ R - R ., .* 0, 0* Nd
.988 .7 .8 .008 1 .0065 1.17 .9 0.02443






















F(B) 0.28 0.84 0.36 0.39 0.29 0.29
F(log c) 1.3 0.89 0.81 0.82 0.84 0.90
F(R)      0.36 0.28 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.27
F(R - R
*) 0.38 0.30 0.20 0.23 0.26 0.32
F()log e) 2.84 0.92 0.94 1.22 1.36 1.85
F()log q) 2.85 0.89 0.53 0.73 1.03 1.52
Corr()log e, )log q) 0.94 0.31 0.89 0.94 0.96 0.98
Corr()logq,)log(c/c
*)) (-0.6,0.2) 0.69 0.67 0.16 0.45 -0.43
Corr(log c,log c
*) (0.2, 0.5) 0.74 0.84 0.82 0.77 0.39
F(R - R
* - E)log e) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11
Corr(R -1 - R
*
-1, )log e) < 0 0.35 0.31 0.18 0.23 0.21
Notes: 
1. Volatilities are reported as percent per quarter (decimal values are multiplied by 100).  
2. Target values for Corr()log q, )log (c/c
*)) are from Backus and Smith.
3. Target values for Corr(log c, log c
*) are from Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland. 
4. Target values for interest rates are computed from HP filtered data from 1980 - 2007, 
    which is the data period for our estimate of the interest rate rule.
5. Target values for other variables are computed from HP filtered data from 1974 - 2007. 44
Figure 1: Home Tax Cut, Money Growth Rules for Monetary Policy
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Figure 2: Foreign Tax Cut, Money Growth Rules for Monetary Policy
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Figure 3: Money Growth Rate Shocks (Calvo and Key Currency price setting)
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Foreign Money Growth Shock 47
Figure 4: Foreign Government Sale of Home bonds (Calvo and Key Currency price setting),
     Interest Rate Rules for Monetary Policy
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H real exchange rate48
Figure 5: Tax Cut Shocks, Interest Rate Rules for Monetary Policy
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Figure 6: Productivity Shocks, Interest Rate Rules for Monetary Policy
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